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BOOK REVIEW
THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION-THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY. By
Ronald J. Bacigal. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1990.
143 pages, $20.00.
Reviewed by J.R. Zepkin*
The Limits of Litigation-The Dalkon Shield Controversy is a
tightly written, interesting book. It takes the reader from the be-
ginning of the litigation concerning the contraceptive device to the
bankruptcy settlement for the claimants. Professor Ronald J. Baci-
gal provides insight into the competing perspectives of the litigants
as these cases crawled through the courts. The book reveals how
the physical and emotional injuries that were suffered by so many
women placed great pressure on the trial judges to force a
resolution.
Prior to writing this book, Bacigal had begun a biography of
Federal District Court Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. During this
time, Judge Merhige had many Dalkon Shield cases pending in his
court and he became a moving force behind the resolution of the
litigation. Because the Dalkon Shield cases were so intricate, Baci-
gal chronicled a separate account of the litigation, resulting in a
compact book of about 125 pages.
This book is written so that both lawyer and non-lawyer will en-
joy it. The book is balanced and explains the views of each side of
the controversy. Professor Bacigal describes the Robins family and
the A.H. Robins Company before their involvement with the
Dalkon Shield as being highly regarded for their integrity and so-
cial conscience. He traces the giant mistakes in judgment by the
A.H. Robins Company, its owners and executive staff. These errors
caused terrible injury to the victims. They also cost the company
* General District Court Judge, Ninth Judicial District; Lecturer in Law, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of William and Mary.
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and its owners their high standing in the business and personal
communities. Ultimately, the Robins family lost control of the
company that earlier members had founded.
The book also makes a convincing argument that the court sys-
tem is not equipped to handle mass litigation. Judge Merhige was
quite active in trying to move the cases to their conclusion. Yet he
was criticized both for being too involved 'and for not being in-
volved enough. As Bacigal points out, there are strongly differing
beliefs as to how much of a manager a trial judge should be.
This aspect of the book is very timely. Increasing pressure is be-
ing placed on trial judges to move litigation through the courts to
avoid delays.' In the Dalkon Shield cases, Judge Merhige and Fed-
eral District Judge Miles W. Lord of Minnesota, who also had
some of the Dalkon Shield cases on his docket, were required to
deal with a large number of lawyers. Many of these attorneys be-
came very personal in their attacks against each other and against
the judges. This made it impossible, without judicial intervention,
for agreement on even routine matters such as pre-trial depositions
and exchange of documents. Appellate courts chastised Judge Mer-
hige and Judge Lord for excess activism. Professor Bacigal shows
both jurists to be deeply concerned over the injuries suffered by
the victims and frustrated by their inability to force the competing
sides to act responsibly in moving the litigation to a conclusion.
When the litigation began, all the principals involved, including
the company and plaintiff's counsel, behaved admirably in terms
of their corporate and professional responsibility. As the litigation
progressed however, their behavior deteriorated. The attorneys
who took the early cases did so knowing there was a good chance
that no recovery would result, and consequently, no attorney's fees
would be generated. But as evidence mounted showing fault and
cover-up on the part of the A.H. Robins Company, the prospect of
1. For example, the Judicial Council of Virginia recently adopted Case Processing Time
Standards. The Council advises: ". . .the court, not the lawyers or litigants, should control
the pace of litigation." See Records of June 1990 meeting of The Judicial Council of Vir-
ginia; see also Commission on the Future of Virginia's Judicial System, Annual Report 22:
"A third way to reduce delay would be a firm judicial commitment to effective case manage-
ment .... The judicial commitment to timely disposition of cases naturally extends to the
relationship of the court to the lawyers appearing before it. While reasonably accommodat-
ing lawyers and their clients, it is the court, not the lawyers or litigants, who must control
the movement of cases. . . . The judge must have both the desire and the authority to press
attorneys and litigants into resolving cases in the least time required for full consideration
of the issues presented."
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recovery grew as did the zeal with which some lawyers sought
Dalkon Shield cases. After the first successful litigation against the
company,' a race for clients began. Law firms used mass advertis-
ing campaigns to solicit more clients. Lawyers fought each other
over these unfortunate victims.
The parties' counsel were not alone in their lack of professional-
ism. Before purchasing the rights to the Dalkon Shield, the A.H.
Robins Company had operated for almost an entire century with-
out having a single product liability action filed against it.' The
company enjoyed an excellent reputation for high standards. Its
owners were respected for their charitable contributions and en-
joyed a high position in the community. However, a picture of
greed and deceit unfolds in the company's handling of the Dalkon
Shield matters. The A.H. Robins Company continued marketing
the device after it had strong evidence of a health risk. The com-
pany then refused to recall the Dalkon Shield, partly in fear of
jeopardizing its position in pending litigation.4 Even after the
shield was taken off American shelves, the Company continued to
market the shield in third world countries. The book details how
the company used false data concerning the effectiveness of the
device in order to market the product." An employee who was
placed in charge of quality control was ignored when he expressed
concern over design features of the Shield.
The breakthrough for the claimants occurred when Roger Tut-
tle, who had previously been in-house counsel for A.H. Robins
Company, disclosed that in accordance with company instructions
he had destroyed important documents. Tuttle further divulged
that he had kept some of the most damaging papers. He then re-
leased these documents to the attorneys representing the claim-
ants.7 This evidence contributed to a huge punitive damage award
against the company.'
The company's next step was to file for reorganization under the
bankruptcy laws. This froze all litigation. At this time, Judge Mer-
hige required the A.H. Robins Company to undertake a -massive
2. BACIGAL, THE LIMITS or LITIGATION-THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY 16 (1990).
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id. at 9.
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 36.
8. Id.
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information campaign to alert all potential claimants that they
must file claims within a certain specified period.
The bankruptcy court worked incessantly to process all of the
327,044 claims filed against the A.H. Robins Company. The inten-
sity of attorney bickering and discourtesy increased.9 Bacigal tells
of attorneys churning cases to run up billable hours. Normally, the
bankruptcy court allows partial interim payments to attorneys
while a bankruptcy case works it way through the system. How-
ever, Judge Merhige was aware of the inordinate number of hours
being billed and refused at one point to approve any more interim
payments for fees. Thus, the lawyers' fees were delayed until the
case concluded.' 0
While the bankruptcy case continued, a series of offers surfaced
to buy the A.H. Robins Company. Like other aspects of this case,
this was not a simple matter either. Offers were made and then
withdrawn. The company executives tried to protect their deferred
bonuses and the value of their stock holdings. A trust fund was
included as part of each proposal in order to pay victims' claims
and there was disagreement over the amount necessary to protect
all claimants. The value of these potential claims was estimated by
the bankruptcy court at $2.475 billion dollars." Finally, American
Home Products bought the company, establishing a trust fund for
the claimants. Following the purchase, skirmishing occurred over
the number and selection of the trustees of the compensation fund
and over the control Judge Merhige would exercise over the
trustees.
This book gives a concise picture of one of the largest mass tort
litigation cases that any of our court systems has ever handled. It
is unfortunate that a company that was truly reputable, and the
legal profession that has contributed so much to the public good,
both failed in this instance to meet their own high ideals.
9. Id. at 59.
10. Id. at 63.
11. Id. at 107.
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